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Ticket Scalping in the Late 1800s and the early 2000s – Much has Changed, Much is the Same  
 
James Devine 
 
 
Overview 
 
In the 1800s, theatergoers were frustrated by ticket speculators, who frequently purchased many 
if not all of the tickets in advance of a show, despite efforts to stop them.  These tickets were 
later resold at inflated prices.  There was little to no legislation at this time, so private parties 
tried to limit the problem through various measures.  Scalpers in the 1800s were able to 
circumvent the physical lines and other rules using various measures, such as proxies.  The 
situation facing concert-goers in the 2000s, is similar to that of the theater patron in the 1800s.  
The consumer today is frustrated by modern day scalpers, who circumvent the ‘virtual line’ 
using special software.  Private measures are being used to address the issue, but not without 
criticism from consumers.  Meanwhile, in the absence of on-point legislation, inappropriate 
federal law has been applied to the practice of ticket scalping, to varying degrees of success.  
Going forward, a uniform federal law is recommended as suited to clarify existing legislation, 
avoid the frustration inherent in varying state law, and address the modern day issues in the 
secondary resale market.  However, given how long it took for early legislation to be adopted, it 
may take years, or may not happen at all given effectiveness of private remedies. 
 
I. The 1800s 
a. The Problem Then 
 “It is nevertheless true that gangs of hardened ticket-speculators [scalpers] exist and carry on 
their atrocious trade with perfect shamelessness.”1 
 Ticket scalping is a practice Americans became familiar with as early as the 1800s, 
existing “since at least 1850, and probably well before that.”2  During this time, the resale of 
tickets was widespread,
3
 and was perceived as a problem.
4
  Unsurprisingly, the major issues of 
the time were similar to those of today. Then, as now, it was not uncommon for the average 
consumer to search for tickets in the primary market to no avail, only to find them on the 
secondary market,
5
 often at inflated prices;
6
  venues often engaged in their own efforts to curb 
ticket scalping, and society was not altogether opposed to the  practice of ticket scalping.  Then, 
as now, the popularity of a show would bring about a corresponding demand and inflated price.   
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In an extreme example, tickets for Charles Dickens’ second American tour in the 1860s, with an 
original face value of $5, were available from speculators for $50.
7
 
The major actor in secondary sales in this time were individuals or networks of men 
known as “ticket speculators” who would purchase large amounts of tickets at once, only to 
resell them at inflated prices.
8
  Ticket speculators, described as “a pariah” in 1883,9 were also 
referred to as “sidewalk men”, as this is where they would often be seen selling tickets.10  
Scalping was a successful enterprise at this time,
11
 and scalpers would invest large amounts of 
capital, buying up to 80% of tickets in advance.
12
  Fierce rivalry for “speculating privileges” 
resulted in death.
13
  Scalpers would also engage the use of ‘proxies’, thereby bypassing long 
lines of regular theatergoers, often buying the whole lot of tickets before others got a chance.
14
  
The use of proxies was a difficult practice to regulate.
15
   
 Some actors in the reselling chain are the same as today.  Many believed, justifiably, that 
theater managers colluded with secondary sellers, withholding seats and passing them to 
scalpers.
16
  Others with occasional early access to tickets later resold them at a higher price.
17
  
Artists themselves were known to withhold tickets and resell them.
18
   Hotels often received 
advanced tickets as a fringe for out-of-town guests—many resold at slight mark up.19  At the 
time, grocers received advanced tickets for posting an advertisement in their windows, with an 
implicit “understanding . . . that [they] would not be sold to scalpers . . . but of course, they were 
sold regularly.”20   Even students, such as those of Princeton and Yale, would resell tickets at 
inflated prices when given early access.
21
   
 During this time, law enforcement was involved, and there were arrests and prosecutions 
to varying degrees of success.  Four men were charged with disorderly conduct in New York in 
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1868 (discharged),
22
 though a Boston man was convicted and fined successfully in 1873.
23
   The 
presence of police was often enough to stop scalpers from selling tickets.
24
 
 
b. Legislation 
Though the majority of complaints from the public targeted increased prices and the 
unavailability of tickets, the presence and prominence of ticket scalpers in the streets was also a 
bother to many citizens.
25
   
In these early years, there were several attempts to pass legislation, but such attempts 
were generally infrequent and unsuccessful during this period.
26
  In New York, legislation failed 
to be passed in 1870,
27
 1884,
28
 and 1908.
29
   New York City took it upon itself to ratify and 
regulate the practice, passing an ordinance in 1880 that required ticket speculators to obtain a 
license and a badge for a fee.
30
  Although there were numerous complaints levied against the 
legislation,
31
 and an official opinion of the Board of Alderman recommending its repeal four 
years later,
32
 the legislation stood. 
However, ticket scalping legislation was eventually enacted in as early as the late 1800s 
and early 1900s.
33
   The early legislation relates to the Sherman and Clayton Act’s regulation on 
price fixing.
34
  Legislation increased significantly in the post-World War II period, as increased 
leisure spending resulted in increased scalping and therefore increased legislation across the 
states.
35
  The early legislation was “aimed to control the location, price, and nuisance effects.”36 
In the early years, there were doubts as to the constitutionality of ticket scalping legislation,
37
 but 
these have long been dismissed.
38
 
c. Themes 
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The effects of ticket scalping in the 1800s were similar to those today in three major 
ways.  First, tickets were often unavailable in the primary market, leaving the average consumer 
to search for tickets in the secondary market.  Second, the absence of legislation resulted in 
private efforts to curb the problem.  Third, society was engaged in a philosophical debate—there 
were those of the belief that the speculators were not a problem, but served a valuable purpose.  
Theaters tried to comply with the demand of their customers who were frustrated by 
ticket speculation.
39
  The theaters engaged in several methods to satisfy the angry customers and 
curb ticket speculation.  One of which was to use “spotters” who would note anyone who bought 
a ‘speculated’ ticket, and then prohibit their entrance at the door.40  This was a common tactic in 
the 1870s, which inevitably “led to many angry confrontations between ticket holders and door 
staff.”41  Another is limits per person42 but these were often ineffective,43 given the use of 
proxies.
44 
  Management for Eastern Park, Brooklyn, which hosted the Princeton-Yale game in 
November of 1890, employed both a limit per person (4 tickets), and waited until the last minute 
to add 1500 reserved seats for the face value of $2, so as to combat scalpers.
45
    
Further measures included complicated registering systems,
46
 and competing directly 
with theater employees go out on the sidewalk and compete with the scalper, offering the ticket 
at the lower (face) price.
47
  Auction systems for ticket sales were used as a response to high 
demand in as early as 1860,
48
 though they were of limited success when overrun by scalpers.
49
   
There were also debates about ticket scalping.  Though an 1893 editorial described the 
practice of ticket scalping as a “species of petty extortion”,50 others questioned if ticket scalping 
should be so vilified.  Then, as now, there were those who viewed ticket scalpers as providing at 
least some benefit, such as making tickets available at a later time for the consumer who does not 
buy tickets in advance.
51
  An editorial for the 1875 theatrical season argued that venues should 
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seek to regulate scalpers, but not completely eliminate them, as some are useful.
52
   Some theater 
goers preferred to pay a premium instead of standing in line.
53
  Scalpers also made tickets 
available to those who chose to go last minute, or for out-of-town travelers who would not have 
been able to purchase them in advance.
54
 When the Fifth Avenue Theater’s private efforts at 
curbing scalping were so successful 1885, patrons complained of “the absence of speculators.”55   
II. The 2000s 
a. The Problem Now 
“Despicable scumbags. If there’s a way to publicly shame them, we should.”56 
As in the 1800s, the current secondary ticket market is often a source of frustration for 
the average consumer.
57
 Though we have progressed from the old image of the typical scalper
58
 
(outside of a venue) the scalping ‘problem’ still exists.  Though these local re-sellers are still in 
play, and are worthy of legislation in and of themselves,
59
 the bulk of scalping today occurs on 
the internet at great distance from the venue, via internet sites such as StubHub, TicketsNow, 
craigslist, eBay, and Facebook.  Compounded with the prevalent online market, there is little 
transparency with respect to concert ticketing; artists withhold tickets to their own shows and 
resell them on secondary sales sites.
60
  Further, ticket brokers, in the states that allow them, often 
sell tickets above face value and can be considered ticket scalpers,
61
 and they are often “lumped 
together [with unregistered scalpers] as a scalper or secondary market.”62 
The internet has brought new challenges to scalpers, along with new protections for 
sellers.
63
 Currently, one of the most significant problems in the ticket market lies in new-age 
software specifically designed to ‘hack’ ticket selling websites, thereby allowing scalpers to 
bypass the virtual line and by many tickets at once.
64
 As a result, the modern secondary ticket 
market results in an average price-market up of 36%, but this can be higher for super-star acts 
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such as U2 (145%) or Bruce Springsteen (240%).
65
  There is a lot of money to be made in the 
business – one recently busted ticket ‘hacking’ and scalping network made $25 million in profit 
before being shut down.
66
  In the year 2000, a study estimated that ticket brokers and scalpers 
made a profit of over $87 million.
67
  The current U.S. secondary market represents a $4 billion a 
year industry.
68
 
Modern-day scalpers are so unscrupulous that they will exploit any event—including 
charity benefit concerts.  This was the case with the Hurricane Sandy Benefit Concert (12/12/12), 
featuring such acts as Paul McCartney, Bruce Springsteen, Bon Jovi, Eric Clapton, The Who, 
and Kanye West, which was subject to flagrant scalping in extreme amounts.
69
  Seats available in 
primary sale for a maximum of $2500 face value were seen on sale for as much as $60,000.
70
  
Only a handful of sites were carrying the tickets, as some vendors “chose the high road”, such as 
Ticketmaster, which barred the sale of tickets in its secondary sites TicketsNow and 
TicketExchange.
71
   StubHub however, allowed the sales and pledged that they would give their 
share—25% of the sale—to the Robin Hood Foundation, operator of the concert.72  When all was 
said and done, they donated about $1 million to the charity,
73
 resulting in around $3 million of 
profit going to scalpers.   
i. Modern Venues and Actors in the resale market 
1. Online sites 
The major players in the ticket resale market are StubHub TicketLiquidator, 
Ticketsnetwork, and TicketsNow.
74
  There are countless websites that a consumer can use.  
These websites provide a venue for individuals to sell and purchase tickets, but also are the cause 
of much disdain and conspiracy theorizing.   
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StubHub is the household name in ticket resale.  The company was originally conceived 
by two Stanford university students, Jeff Fluhr and Eric Baker, for a business plan competition, 
but they developed such enthusiasm for the project that they decided to make it real.
75
  As told 
by co-founder Jeff Fluhr, there were three characteristics of the secondary resale market that 
showed a great opportunity:  
Number one: . . . it was a large market in the U.S., . . . we estimated that it could be as 
big as ten billion. . . The second characteristic . . . was the fact that it was a highly 
fragmented business, so there was no dominant national player that was addressing the 
secondary ticket market . . . the third thing . . . was the fact that it was really a 
stigmatized market that was leaving consumers with a lack of trust, and sort of a bit of 
concern around getting legitimate tickets.
76
 
 
StubHub launched in August 2000 with $550,000 in early investment.
77
   The first thing the 
entrepreneurs did with their start-up financing was investigate the legality of the enterprise, 
hiring a regulatory law firm to perform a nationwide survey of existing law.
78
 They noted the 
lack of federal law,
79
 and that “most states  . . . did not have restrictive ticket resale laws”,80 and 
went on to grow a business from a small investment to company that in 2006 had “400 million . . 
. of top-line gross ticket sales.”81  In 2005, it had revenue of about 50 million,82 and in 2006 
around 100 million.
83
  StubHub is also a major player in professional sports, as it is currently 
partnered with as many as sixty sports teams.
84
  The founders ultimately sold the company to 
eBay in 2007, for $310 million.
85
 
 While many are probably pleased with the ease of use and reliability that StubHub 
provides, especially given that “almost 50 percent of the tickets [sell for] face value or below”,86 
others are extremely frustrated by its existence.
87
 The purchase of StubHub by eBay spurred 
Ticketmaster into action, and it purchased TicketsNow in 2007 “as a defensive move.”88    
 Many question the large online secondary resale operations.  There are those that view 
Ticketmaster, and their associated secondary markets, as a monopoly that has no vested interest 
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in correcting these issues,
89
 the combination being a simple conspiracy “to enrich Ticketmaster, 
venues, artists, and scalpers.”90  Unsurprisingly, several years after the purchase there was a 
significant issue which drew a lot of attention in 2009.
91
  Consumers were told on Ticketmaster’s 
primary website that the show was sold out, only to be directed from Ticketmaster’s secondary 
site TicketsNow, where tickets were available.
92
    
Ticketmaster is also under attack for its attempts to regulate the secondary market using 
paperless tickets.
93
  For example, the Fan Freedom project frequently attacks Ticketmaster, such 
as by asking for an investigatory probe into Ticketmaster when it refused to report to authorities 
known ticket sniping in event sales.
94
  The Fan Freedom project argues that paperless tickets hurt 
the average consumer.
95
  However, the Fan Freedom Project is funded by StubHub,
96
 which has 
an obvious vested interest in a thriving secondary resale market, with the uninhibited transfer of 
tickets.  Further, StubHub has successfully lobbied to protect their business, and changed “the 
laws in states like New York, Florida, and Pennsylvania.”97  
When the average consumer thinks of buying a ticket to a sold-out event, craiglist is 
likely not the first site that comes to mind.  However, craigslist is a viable secondary market for 
music concerts and sporting events.
 98
  As with all craigslist categories, new listings are posted 
continually on a daily basis, though many of these postings simply direct consumers to other 
secondary ticket sites.  A general search will list all tickets, both by owner and by dealer, though 
the user can narrow down the list based on these categories.
99
  Tickets by dealer postings will 
typically contain links to direct the user to an outside secondary ticket selling website, while 
tickets by owner will take you to a nondescript craigslist posting.
100
  Craigslist disclaims all 
liability for the transaction.
101
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Similarly, eBay is likely not the first choice of the average consumer, though it too offers 
tickets to a wide range of events.
102
  A note in 2009 commented that a search for “tickets” on 
eBay yielded 246,598 results.
103
  The market has grown—a current search (late 2012) yields 
652,978 results.
104
  eBay places the onus of knowing applicable local law on the seller of the 
tickets.
105
  Unlike craigslist, eBay offers its typical buyer protection, in the event that the tickets 
never arrive or if the tickets are not what were advertised.
106
   
Facebook is involved the ticket market.  Facebook recently asserted influence in the 
primary market by integrating the ticket purchasing experience so the user never leaves the 
Facebook page, with such outlets as Ticketmaster, StubHub, Ticketfly.
107
  Facebook also 
partnered with EventBrite,
108
 a full-service website for anyone hosting an event, which allows 
the host to promote the event, create an event web page, and charge admission offering guests 
either printable and paperless tickets.
109
  Eventbrite offers this service for a small fee per 
ticket.
110
  A similar service is available through ThunderTix, for bands to sell tickets to their 
shows through their Facebook pages.
111
 
Facebook is also in and of itself a secondary market.  This is not surprising, given that the 
site is designed to connect people and provides an easy method to make an announcement that 
there are tickets for sale.  For example, it was recently reported that students and graduates of 
Syracuse University, all members of a college-oriented student groups on Facebook, are using 
the site as a forum to buy and sell tickets.
112
   Given the size of Facebook,
113
 there is no reason to 
believe this is an isolated incident.  
2. Artists withholding  
One current issue in the modern resale market is the lack of transparency in ticket 
withholding.  Ticket withholding is frustrating to the average consumer, as it results in limited 
10 
 
available seats to the general public and inflated prices in the secondary market.  Some of 
described the situation as “a clear consumer protection issue[, as] tickets supposedly being 
offered for sale are not available on publicly advertised websites, but are instantly available at 
jacked-up prices on resale websites.”114  However, others argue that artists are in control of their 
show, and can do what they please with their tickets. 
There are many parties involved in ticket withholding, which results in fewer tickets on 
sale to the general public. Those involved in ticket withholding include artists, venues, record 
companies, talent agencies, radio stations, credit card companies (American Express), and 
sponsoring corporations.
115
  Ticketmaster itself is involved, as “the company routinely offers to 
list hundreds of the best tickets per concert on one of its two resale Web sites—and dives the 
extra revenue, which can amount to more than $2 million on a major tour, with artists and 
promoters.”116  Ticketmaster does this with a range of artists, from Neil Diamond117 to Lady 
Gaga.
118
  
Artists are some of the major culprits, as many are withholding tickets to their own shows 
for their own purposes, such as passing them along to friends or family.  However, a significant 
amount end up on secondary resale sites generating a healthy profit.
119
  For example, Katy Pery 
includes ticket withholding and resale in her contract rider.
120
   Justin Bieber engages in a similar 
practice.
 121
  It is unlikely that this language is overly unique in the industry, as many artists are 
withholding tickets, such as Britney Spears, Celine Dion, Bon Jovi, Van Halen, Billy Joel, Elton 
John,
122
 and other artists stand to gain an additional two million in revenue on a tour.
123
 
Fan clubs present another source of ticket resale.  Artist’s fan clubs take membership fees 
and in exchange give early access to tickets. This gives fans, but also scalpers who pay the 
membership fee, early access to tickets.  In some extreme examples, Keith Urban charges $25 
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(and retains) for fan club membership fees and saw twelve $25 front-row seats for a Hall of 
Fame Benefit concert scalped at $642 per ticket;
124
 Taylor swift charges $20 for dues and offers 
primary access to ticket presales to members, resulting in some seats allocated for fans at $49.50 
being available for $1177 per ticket.
125
  Similarly, tickets for a Britney Spears concert priced at 
$39.50 were priced at $1,188.60.
126
 
3. ‘Bots’ and ‘Ticket sniping’ 
In the 1800s, people waited in long lines for tickets.  Unfortunately for the average 
consumer, oftentimes many of those in line were proxies for ticket speculators.  Today, people 
wait in “virtual lines” on a website when seeking tickets for shows.  Unfortunately for the 
average consumer today, when your time arrives there are no more tickets available—they have 
all been purchased by scalpers using ‘ticket bots’ who use software to “essentially cut the line 
[violating] the first-come, first-served doctrine of a queue[.]”127 
With the advent of online ticket sales came new technologically advanced and enhanced 
tools for ticket scalping.  ‘Bots’ are “automated program[s] that navigate[] website[s] faster and 
more efficiently than humans can . . . unscrupulous [programs that allow] ticket resellers to “cut 
the line” and grab as many [tickets] as possible for resale at higher prices.”128  Ticket ‘bots’ pose 
one of the more serious problems in the modern ticket resale market, and their “prevalence . . . 
has already raised questions about the industry’s claims of fairness in online sales.”129  ‘Bot’ use 
on Ticketmaster’s website is extremely prevalent, amounting to as much as 80% of ticket 
requests on certain days.
130
 
Sellers of the software boast that for only $990, you can bypasses CAPTCHA 
technology, quantity limits, and queues, simultaneously “grab[bing] hundreds of tickets for 
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multiple event[s] . . . with just a single click.”131   ‘Bot’ use is sometimes referred to as 
‘Ticketsniping.’132  
While ‘bot’ use is rampant, primary ticket sellers are doing their part to try to control 
them.  Ticketmaster is targeting the creators of the software.  Ticketmaster’s paperless ticketing 
system is viewed as a strong remedy to ‘bot’ usage and ticket scalping.133  Ticketfly, another 
online seller, seeks to control ‘bots’ by using algorithms that recognize behavior that is 
impossible for humans to achieve, and then shutting down that computer address.
134
  Another 
tactic is litigation, such as the 2007 case in which Ticketmaster sued RMG Technologies for 
developing software that circumvented their anti-scalping measures.
135
  Ticketmaster emerged 
victorious with award of 18.2 million.
136
  So far several states have enacted legislation to curb 
the use of ticket bots.
137
  Colorado, Tennessee, Indiana, and Minnesota have criminalized ticket 
sniping, while North Carolina and Oregon have created for civil remedy.
138
  New Jersey may 
soon join these states, as proposed legislation is making its way through the legislature.
139
 
b. Legislation 
i. State 
Currently, twenty-eight States regulate ticket resale in some form.
140
  Seven states 
regulate weakly, 11 allow resale in same form.
141
  However, “most states now accept online 
ticket reseller as part of a legitimate, useful and vibrant secondary sales market, especially if the 
resellers register with the state, provide consumer protections, and pay taxes as required.”142  
 The State of New Jersey is contemplating a ticket resale bill, S-875, sponsored by State 
Senators Raymond Lesniak (D-Union) and Robert Singer (R-Monmouth and Union), which 
would significantly alter the ticket market in in the state.
143
  A review of this bill provides an 
example of the pros, cons, and complexities of legislating the current ticket resale market.  
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The bill proposes new additions to existing law, many of which are aimed at increasing 
transparency and accountability.  The proposed bill would require that all tickets issued bear a 
traceable barcode identifying each ticket and its original sale, to be kept on record for five 
years.
144
  Under the proposed legislation, ticket sellers would be required to provide advance 
notice to the public, within fifteen days of an event, the total number of tickets issued that are for 
public sale, those that are not for public sale, and those that are given to fan clubs, business, or 
other promotions.
145
  The act would also forbid insiders
146
, which includes the venue, agent, 
producer, and the artist, from selling tickets prior to general sale.
147
   
Lesniak and Singer’s proposed bill stands to protect the consumer interests of New 
Jersey.  The proposed legislation also directly targets limitations imposed on the  consumers 
ability to resell a  or exchange tickets, by forbidding such devices as restrictive e-tickets, 
conditioning entry on the presentation of a document, or requiring a ‘will call’ method for 
picking up tickets.
148
  S-875 also ameliorates consumer concerns of monopolization of secondary 
ticketing by eliminating the ability for a primary seller to impose a restriction that requires a 
ticket be sold through a specific channel.
149
 
 S-875 also targets the technological advancements that have made for widespread abuse 
in the secondary market—ticket bots.  The proposed legislation forbids the use of technology to 
disguise identity so as to gain access to more tickets by circumventing the limitations imposed by 
the owner or operator of the event,
150
 or to skip waiting queues or other limitations imposed by 
the primary seller.
151
  
 The proposal also adds serious penalties.
152
  S-875 proposes that “any person who 
violates [the law] shall be subject to all remedies and penalties available pursuant to the 
[Consumer Fraud Act,]” meaning $10,000 for a first offense, $20,000 for a repeat offense.153  S-
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875 also proposes that violators are guilty of a crime in the 4
th
 degree,
154
  a misdemeanor.
155
  
Classification as a crime of the 4
th
 degree carries a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18 
months.
156
   
While S-875 benefits the consumer in key ways, it simultaneously and unquestionably 
benefits the secondary sales market.  Section 8 of the proposed Act forbids a ticket issuer from 
bringing legal action against secondary sellers for violation of their restrictions on secondary sale 
—be it the average person, “who facilitate[s] or provide[s] services for the resale of tickets[,]” or 
the online powerhouse StubHub, “[t]he operator of a physical or electronic marketplace in which 
a ticket is offered for resale[.]”157   
Further, the proposed legislation also removes key language from existing law.  The Act 
repeals the existing special regulation of ticket brokers and would end the requirement that ticket 
brokers register with the division of Consumer Affairs.  S-875 also removes the portion of 
existing law that places a ceiling price on ticket resale, by eliminating language that restricts the 
resale of a ticket by an average person in excess of 20% of the ticket price, or the registered 
ticket broker from purchasing a ticket with the intent of reselling the ticket in excess of 50% of 
price paid to acquire the ticket.
158
   
The bill is being met with both support and hesitation.  There are those that support the 
ban on restrictive tickets.
159
 However, many disagree.  The CEO of the New Jersey Sports & 
Exposition Authority opined that while he understands the intent of the bill and does not oppose 
what it seeks to address, “there are practical consequences in what’s set forth right now.” 160  The 
CIO of the same organization believes the bill is unnecessary, as less than one percent of tickets 
are paperless.
161
  It is understandable that the concert industry would “balk” at the legislation’s 
restriction on venues withholding tickets for direct sale in the secondary market, as it “would 
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presumably [result in] a violation of . . . the Consumer Fraud Act, which can include minimum 
fines of $10,000.”162  Further, some believe that the bill in its current form will make the state 
less attractive as a venue, and that artists will take their shows to other states.
163
 
ii. Federal 
1. Incorrectly applied law 
There is some federal legislation that is not directly aimed at ticket scalping and online 
resale, but attempts have been made to apply it.  At least two federal acts have been 
inappropriately applied to ‘new-age’ ticket scalping; the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) 
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”). 
The Communications Decency Act of 1996
164
 is a federal act with numerous affects, one 
of which is the treatment of online resale operations under state law.  It was enacted in direct 
response to court decisions that placed the risk of liability on service providers that regulated 
offensive material on their sites; the presumed effect of these holdings was that “service 
providers [would be deterred] from blocking and screening offensive material.”165   
The CDA was adopted to “remove disincentives” from service providers so as to allow 
them to regulate and filter the material on their sites.
166
  The Act is designed to “preserve the 
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”167  One of the ways the Act 
achieves this end is to “immunize providers of interactive computer services from civil liability 
in tort with respect to material disseminated by them but created by others.”168  The result under  
§ 230 is that much like online message boards,
169
 eBay,
170
 and Amazon.com,
171
 resale sites such 
as StubHub, TicketsNow, and Cheaptickets may not liable for the third party content on their 
websites—the tickets sold.172 
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This was the result obtained in Milgram v. Orbitz, in which the State of New Jersey 
recently sued TicketsNetwork,
173
 a large online ticket market that contains up to seven million 
tickets for sale from third party sellers at any time.
174
  In response to the ticketing fiasco 
surrounding the 2009 Bruce Springsteen tour,
175
 the State was targeting the sale of tickets prior 
to the general on-sale date and sellers failing to inform consumers that they did not physically 
possess and control the offered tickets at the time of sale.
176
  Both of these actions are forbidden 
by TicketNetwork’s terms of use.177  Similarly, the state argued, these acts were in violation of 
New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act.178   
Under § 230, immunity is given to ‘interactive computer services’ that act as publishers 
of third party information, as opposed to those that become ‘information content providers,’ 
transcending mere publishing into actual creation of content.
179
  The Court in Milgram 
determined that TicketNetwork was an “interactive computer service,”180 and imported the 
reasoning from two defamation cases, which were deemed applicable to ticket sales.
181
  
Ultimately, the Court determined that TicketNetwork was not liable under the State’s Consumer 
Fraud Act
182, as § 230 “afforded . . . broad immunity.”183 
The court in New Jersey noted that there is contrary, though non-binding authority in 
NPS, LLC v. Stubhub.
184
  In NPS, the New England Patriots sued StubHub over the resale of 
season tickets on their site, and StubHub’s motion for partial summary judgment on the count of 
intentional interference was denied.
185
  The court determined that while StubHub would not lose 
immunity under § 230 for simply knowing of illegal activity on the site,
186
 if it was proven that 
StubHub engaged in the level of knowing sufficient to constitute illegal ticket scalping, it would 
not receive section § 230 immunity.
187
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It is debatable if the CDA should apply to ticket resellers or online auction houses.  The 
Act’s primary purpose “was to control the exposure of minors to indecent material.”188  Section 
230 immunity is based on the actor’s status as a publisher,189 possibly as a distributor.190  This is 
why most § 230 suits are about defamation.
191
   
Given § 230’s focus on contribution to speech website content, it could be said it is a 
stretch to apply the Act to an online resale sites.
192
  The Seventh Circuit has deemed the section 
does not in fact create immunity, and when StubHub sought to invoke § 230(c)(1) in the context 
of a tax lawsuit, the court dismissed the Act as irrelevant outside of the context of publishing 
information or speech.
193
  Further, the Seventh the Circuit intimated that § 230 may operate as a 
definitional statute.
194
    
In any event, § 230 must not create a comprehensive immunity, as online music sharing 
services that enable copyright infringement “may be liable for contributory infringement if their 
system is designed to help people steal music or other material in copyright.”195  Similarly, § 230 
should does not protect online resale websites to the extent that knowingly and purposefully 
violate the law.
196
 
However, the argument for § 230 providing this ‘immunity’ is understandable.  The same 
logic applies to eBay or StubHub as much as it applies to an online message board—the sites 
should be incentivized to regulate illegitimate content, and should not avoid doing so for fear of 
liability.
197
  Further, the sites do not create the content (the tickets)—this is done by a third party, 
and which is the precise immunity the CDA provides.
198
   However, the Act seems designed to 
protect speech and to insulate the websites that seek to regulating their content, thereby keeping 
robust political discourse but protecting children from offensive material.
199
  Nonetheless, the 
CDA does not expressly state that § 230 immunity should not apply to these types of websites.
200
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Another Act applied to ticket scalping is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which is 
directed at unauthorized computer access.  While a thorough discussion addressing the nuances 
of the CFAA is outside the scope of this paper, it is notable that the Act has been raised in both 
civil and criminal courts as a potential weapon against abuse in the ticket market.  However, use 
of the Act in the context of ticket reselling raises concern. 
 The CFAA was passed in 1984, and is designed to criminalize unauthorized access to 
computers.
201
  The Act was “originally designed to criminalize only important federal interest 
computer crimes,” but has been expanded many times, making it ”one of the most far-reaching 
criminal laws in the United States Code.”202  Though a criminal statute, the CFAA allows for 
plaintiff’s “who suffer[] damage or loss . . . to maintain civil action[s] . . . to obtain 
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.”203  The CFAA is mostly 
applied in civil actions and not criminal cases.
204
    It is because of these expansions that attempts 
have been made to apply the law against ticket scalpers. 
In 2010, four men from California, working collectively as “Wiseguys Tickets,” were 
brought up on charges for their actions in the ticket market, which affected numerous sporting 
events and concerts.
205
  The Wiseguys cyber fraud enterprise manipulated the ticket market, 
growing to an estimated value of $25 million.
206
  Essentially, the Wiseguys obtained tickets 
before the general public even got a chance, only to resell them to that public at inflated prices.   
The resulting case was United States v. Lowson in the District of New Jersey, in which 
Attorney General Paul Fishman sued the four individuals alleging violations of the CFAA.
207
  
The U.S. sought to hold the Wiseguys accountable for ‘hacking’ Ticketmaster’s website in “one 
of the largest [cases] in the history of the ticketing business.”208  Wiseguys recruited 
programmers from Bulgaria to circumvent CAPTCHA technology, and used ‘bots’ to circumvent 
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as virtual lines and limits per customer.
209
  The Wiseguys “allegedly created and managed 
hundreds of fake Internet domains and thousands of addresses to disguise their activities from 
online ticket sellers.”210  Despite the seemingly deliberate fraud engaged in by the defendants in 
Lowson, and a potential sentence of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine,
211
 a plea of “guilty 
to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and gain unauthorized access to protected computers”212 
resulted in a mild sentence.  In addition to rescission of profits and community service,
213
 the 
Honorable Katherine Sweeney Hayden (D. N.J.) sentenced the defendants to two years’ 
probation and alcohol & drug treatment.
214
 
Though the Judge’s opinion was criticized by some as being too lenient,215 there were 
those that were pleased with the outcome.
216
 The potential implications that an expansive view of 
the Act may bring are worth pause.  As Judge Hayden noted, though Lowson was a criminal 
case, it was about “e-commerce” and the “state of the law is very gray.”217  If the CFAA is 
interpreted broadly, a user who engages in contractual violation of a website’s term of service 
could face criminal penalty.  This would result in a potential sea change, in which private actors 
fundamentally create criminal law. 
This is why a similar result was obtained in U.S. v. Drew, an earlier CFAA case in which 
a jury convicted the defendant of misdemeanor charges for violating the terms of use imposed by 
the Myspace website.
218
  The defendant’s motion for acquittal was granted on appeal.219  The 
Court had the same concern raised in Lowson—to criminalize the conduct of violating a 
website’s terms of use would result in many innocent Internet users being converted into 
misdemeanor criminals.
220
  Further, criminalizing the conduct on a websites term of service leads 
to vagueness problems,
221
 and is an interpretation of the Act that must be rejected.
222
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Several articles have commented on the CFAA, address issues of vagueness and over 
breadth,
223
 and the potential of the act of criminalizing a broad range of conduct.
224
  Similarly, 
amicus briefs were submitted in both the Lowson and Drew cases, opining that the CFAA must 
not be so applied.
225
 
2. Proposed Legislation 
 In 1998, Congressman Gary Ackerman of New York proposed the ‘Ticket Scalping 
Reduction Act.’226  It was a scant but imposing legislation.  The proposed act defined scalping as 
the resale of a “ticket at a markup of more than $5 or 10 percent of the face value[.]”227   The act 
provided that anyone in violation of the act—those who “scalped” 5 or more tickets in any single 
transaction—“shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.”228    
Several years later, Representative Bill Pascrell of New Jersey achieved some modicum 
of fame from his proposed legislation that addresses issues in the secondary ticket market.  
Pascrell borrows the moniker of one of New Jersey’s most famous natives for the acronym of the 
BOSS Act, or Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and Accountability in Concert Ticketing Act.   
The proposed BOSS Act would utilize the FTC as the enforcement arm to offers 
consumers much need relief from abuse in the secondary ticket market.
229
  A violation of the Act 
is considered the equivalent of an unfair or deceptive act or practice.
230
  The Act would allow the 
Attorney General of any state to bring suit under the Act,
231
 and the District Courts would have a 
wide array of remedies at their disposal.
232
   
The BOSS Act would provide for transparency and accountability in the ticket market.  
The Act requires that ticket sellers be registered and provide viable contact information.
233
  
Primary ticket sellers must disclose the total number of tickets offered for sale as well as the 
amount and distribution of tickets that are not available to the general public.
234
  They must also 
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include the face value and any other associated charges or fees.
235
  Secondary sellers must clearly 
state if they possess the ticket at the time of sale and provide procedures for refund if the ticket is 
not as advertised.
236
  Online resale marketplaces must disclose to the consumer if the secondary 
seller is a primary seller, venue, or artist.
237
  
The BOSS Act also calls for some significant changes in to the market.  These drastic and 
potentially efficacious changes include the prohibition on purchase of tickets by a secondary 
seller during the first 48 hours of primary sale
238
  and the prohibition on the resale of ticket by 
employees of the venue, primary ticket sellers, artists, online resale marketplaces, and box 
offices, if that resale is for a higher price than face value, or if made to a third party that intends 
to resell. 
239
  A newest version of the Act, not yet formally introduced, includes the most needed 
regulation of all, directly targeting computer ‘bot’ software and paperless tickets 
transferability.
240
  As officially proposed, the BOSS Act has so far failed to gain any traction in 
the Senate.  It is not without its critics.
241
   
c. Themes 
As in the 1800s, the modern ticket market is similar in least three major ways.  First, 
tickets are often unavailable in the primary market, leaving the average consumer to search for 
tickets in the secondary market, as discussed above. Second, the absence of legislation results in 
private efforts to curb the problem.  Third, society is engaged in a philosophical debate—there 
are those of the belief that the scalpers are not a problem, but serve a valuable purpose. 
i. Private Ordering 
1. Ticketmaster’s measures 
Ticketmaster is no stranger to playing the villain and is frequently lambasted.   However, 
Ticketmaster does seek to control the ticket market and institute “a fair and equitable ticket 
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buying process.”242 Ticketmaster employs several methods to achieve this goal.  The first of 
these methods is contract.  Ticketmaster’s website carries “Terms of Service” which prohibit the 
use of the site for commercial gain and using a computer program to navigate the site 
automatically.
243
  The agreement also limits the number of tickets available to each individual 
purchaser in a single transaction.
244
  Ticketmaster also “employs a number of technological 
means,” such as CAPTCHA technology, which aim to prevent the raiding of Ticketmaster’s 
website by ticket bots.
245
  Ticketmaster has also recently adopted the paperless ticket as the latest 
means against scalping.
246
  
a. Paperless  
The ticket resale industry, like so many other industries, has been changed by the 
internet.  Tickets are readily available for sold out events on any number of websites.  One aspect 
of live entertainment that had remained relatively consistent was the physical ticket itself as 
being transferrable from one person to another, be it as a gift or sold for a profit (prohibitive 
legislation aside).  Indeed, there have been recent advances, such as the ability for the consumer 
to digitally download and print tickets at home before going to the venue,
247
 but these tickets 
may still be sold in the secondary market.  A recent development designed to curb the secondary 
market is being heralded as a sea change—paperless ticketing.   
Paperless ticketing is available in railroad travel,
248
 air travel,
249
 and recently, the 
entertainment industry;
250
 for concerts
251
 and sporting events.
252
  Paperless ticketing is purported 
to help the consumer as a means of preventing “fraud by eliminating a paper-based ticket and 
only using electronic information to verify a purchaser’s identity.”253  Paperless ticketing appears 
to be the future, as Apple is developing a paperless ticketing app for both concerts
254
 and 
travel.
255
  Ticketmaster, who recently adopted the paperless ticket,
256
 claims that the new ticket 
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offers fans “more convenience,” as the customer does not have to stand in line at a will-call 
window.
257
  With a paperless ticket, the user receives no physical paper ticket or digital file for 
print, but must bring the credit card used to purchase the ‘tickets’ online and present it at the 
door.
258
   
By linking entrance to the venue with the credit card of purchase, paperless tickets seek 
to control the secondary market.
259
  By requiring the credit card of purchaser at the point of 
entry, paperless ticketing places a significant road block to large-scale ticket resale operations 
and at the same time curtails the possibility of resale for the average consumer. 
260
  At this time, 
paperless tickets are a small part of the overall market.
261
   
Though Ticketmaster’s adoption of paperless tickets attempts to benefit fans by 
preventing this type of fraud, it has resulted in outrage.
262
   The opponents argue that paperless 
ticketing in concerts and sporting events raise consumer protection and competition issues.
263
  
Paperless tickets encumber the average consumer by limiting their ability to resell a ticket, and 
placing restriction on entrance to an event. The proponents of paperless tickets contend that 
paperless ticketing will limit abuse in the secondary market, though this may not be a total 
success.   
Paperless tickets are designed to limit ticket resale by linking the ticket itself to the 
individual purchaser.  Paperless ticketing finds its supporters in primary sellers such as 
Ticketmaster and LiveNation, but also in the artists themselves, like Bruce Springsteen.
264
  North 
America Ticketmaster spokesperson Jacqueline Peterson attests that it would be “very 
challenging” for scalpers to sell paperless tickets.265  Indeed, paperless tickets are an effective 
means of curbing the use of ticket bots.
266
  However, it is easy to conceive of ways to circumvent 
paperless ticketing restrictions.  For example, the reseller could buy the paperless tickets with 
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multiple credit cards as before, then have an agent go to the venue with the purchasers and 
transfer the tickets at the door. 
Opponents of paperless tickets feel that “[p]aperless tickets sound convenient . . .[b]ut in 
truth, they’re a nightmare for fans.”267  Paperless tickets are believed to infringe on the consumer 
by restricting gifting of tickets, restricting the resale of tickets, limiting availability of tickets to 
sold-out shows, causing delay at the venue as patrons have id and credit card checked, all while 
granting Ticketmaster a monopoly over the process.
268
  The paperless ticket system also causes a 
significant inconvenience in entering the venue.  With Ticketmaster’s paperless ticketing, 
multiple patrons under one friend’s or family member’s credit card must all enter at the same 
time.
269
  
Consumers can find solace in the possibility of reselling their tickets on Ticketmaster’s 
secondary ticket exchange site, TicketsExchange, if the venue and artist and promoter allow for 
this.
270
  However, there may be limitations placed on the resale, such as not being allowed to sell 
the ticket for below face value.
271
  Again, this does not solve the problem, as a significant gripe 
lies with Ticketmaster’s control over the entire process.272  Further, if Ticketmaster controls this 
process, they can charge fees, or implement minimum resale prices.
273
  
Consumers in New York are so frustrated with paperless ticketing that a class action was 
recently filed in the District Court against LiveNation and Ticketmaster, alleging that the 
companies violated New York State law by only offering paperless tickets.
274
  The plaintiffs 
allege that the sellers violate state law by not allowing an option to transfer the ticket.
275
  
However, consumers must decide which is more frustrating—the use of ticket bots resulting in 
increased prices, or the restrictions of paperless tickets.
276
  
2. Variable Pricing, Auctions, and Aggregators 
25 
 
Another recent development in the ticket market for sporting events is variable pricing, a 
tactic borrowed from Broadway and Airline tickets,
277
 which is deemed a way to help combat 
scalping.
278
  Variable pricing describes the method of pricing based on an estimation of 
consumer demand; charging higher prices for more popular opponents or popular nights, such as 
weekend games.
279
  Many MLB baseball teams have instituted variable ticket pricing.
280
   The 
pricing mechanism helps ball clubs who would otherwise be absorbing the loss of unsold 
seats.
281
  Fan reaction is mixed to variable ticket pricing, as some fans view it as price gouging, 
others may recognize the potential in subsidizing less popular games.
282
  
Yet another innovation designed to curb ticket scalping is dynamic pricing, in which 
“promoters and artists [sell] the most desirable seats in an auction format.”283  Variable pricing 
allows the ticket seller to match prices to market fluctuation, and may in fact be the future of 
ticket pricing.
284
  Dynamic pricing is viewed as another tool against ticket scalping,
285
and as the 
wave of the future.
286
 
 Yet another innovation is an aggregator website, such SeatGeek, which sorts tickets from 
dozens of websites and lists them in a single page.
287
   Basically, the website shows you the 
tickets in a rank order based on a predictive score, incorporating such factors as consumer 
preference and “the gap between the asking price and the predicted market value of the ticket.”288  
Ticket aggregators can put pressure on the ticket market, possibly resulting in lower fees.
289
 
3. Artists’ Own Actions 
One solution lies in the control of the individual artist.  As with many other aspects of 
show business, the artist can retain control over aspects of the performance, though their ability 
to do so depends on their bargaining power (popularity).  If the artist wanted to exercise control 
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over the ticketing aspect of their show, they can.  Artists can curb abuse through paperless tickets 
or other unique limitations on resale. 
In terms of creativity, look no further than comedian Louis C.K.  When recently 
frustrated with ticket resale abuse of his shows and its effect on his fans, the comedian adopted 
his own ticket policy in an experiment.
290
  The policy placed limitations on the person’s ability to 
make profit off a ticket, and was designed to directly curb the type of digital scalping we are 
growing familiar with. 
 You’ll see that if you try to sell the ticket anywhere for anything above the original 
price, we have the right to cancel your ticket (and refund your money).  This is 
something I intend to enforce.  There are some other rules you may find annoying but 
they are meant to prevent someone who has no intention of seeing the show from 
buying the ticket and just flipping it for twice the price from a thousand miles away.
291
 
 
The policy resulted in a 96% decrease in scalping, and still resulted in over 6 million in tickets 
sold.
292
 
The British rock band Radiohead has been known as progressive for most of its career.  
They achieved some notoriety in 2007 when they conduct an experiment, selling their album “In 
Rainbows” online for a pay-what-you-want price.293  They are no less pragmatic when it comes 
to their concerts.  In response to the woes of many fans paying inflated prices for tickets, 
Radiohead recently partnered with Ticket Trust, so that members of the band’s fan club who are 
no able to attend the concert can resell their tickets through their website at face value.
294
  The 
band is also known to use paperless ticketing to control inflated prices in the secondary market, 
though this is not well received by fans.
295
  They also go as far as to limit the number of tickets 
sold to each individual purchaser; some of the band’s recent shows in the New York City area 
were sold digitally on a two-person per household basis.
296
   
ii. Attitude and philosophy 
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As in the 1800s, ticket scalping today is disliked,
297
 but also subject to debate.
298
  Some 
want legislation,
299
 and others wanting a free market without restriction.
300
  Opinions vary from 
those that are not upset about inflated prices and are willing to pay more for a second chance,
301
   
to those that lament the way that base prices for concert tickets are currently being set and its 
resemblance to “the health insurance industry or the bank industry—they see an opportunity for a 
lot of money and they exploit it.”302 
Modern day ticket prices are based on “a perceived notion of fairness—that the face 
value of a ticket is actually the ‘fair value.’”303  Ticket scalping legislation is based on the public 
perception that resale of tickets above market value is unfair, “despite making economic 
sense.”304  However, some assert that the secondary market is natural, given the underpricing of 
concert seats.
305
  The face value of a ticket is typically below the market value, which leaves a 
“consumer surplus”—“the positive difference between what they would have paid for the ticket 
and the price they actually paid.”306  As in the 1800s, modern day online ticket scalpers attempt 
to capture this “consumer surplus” by buying the tickets in bulk before the consumer has a 
chance, and then reselling them to the consumer, often at an inflated price.
307
   
Ticket scalping is not without its proponents,
308
 as ticket scalpers are not without their 
benefits.
309
  It gives those who could not (or chose not) to wait in line an opportunity to purchase 
tickets.
310
  Some people are not upset about inflated prices, and are willing to pay more for a 
second chance.
311
   Some believe that the market simply controls and corrects itself.
312
  Some 
argue that market corrections the most prevalent problems, such as ticket sniping, with schemes 
like variable pricing and paperless ticketing, makes legislation unnecessary.
313
   
Society reacts to problems it perceives as worthy.  As in the 1800s, many are frustrated 
by the way the ticket resale market is seemingly allowed to operate as it does, allowing those 
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who purchased a bulk of tickets or withheld tickets to resale them at significantly increased 
profit. Though this frustrates many who complain about the unavailability of tickets, inflated 
prices, and the use of ticket bots, there is little legislation addressing the sources of the problem. 
However, when scalpers were selling tickets to the Hurricane Sandy Benefit Concert, the 
legislature was quick to react to what was deemed truly appalling, and quickly proposed law 
outlawing the resale of tickets to charity events for higher than face value.
314
  Until society 
deems the scalping of a wide array of concerts on a daily basis as worthy, there can be no 
significant legislative change.  Given that the scalping legislation started on a significant basis 
well into the 1900s, we may have to wait some time.  By that time, private ordering may have 
addressed the problem to the satisfaction of the consumer through such methods as increased 
security, variable pricing and paperless technology.
315
 
III. Proposal: Federal legislation or a uniform code on the regulation of secondary sales 
The issues we face in the modern ticket market are similar to those caused by ticket 
scalpers in the 1800s, albeit with different actors in a different form and in a different time.  
Time has proven that the problem of ticket speculation is not an easy one to fix,
316
 and that 
widespread legislation may be some years if it comes at all.  Some argue that legislation is ill-
equipped to address modern-day ticket scalping, and therefore not needed as the market 
successfully responded on its own by implementing variable pricing and paperless tickets.
317
 
Before any legal solution can be developed, society must decide that the current ticket 
market is so unfair that it in fact requires regulation.  As of yet, our society does not yet appear 
so displeased, or the legislature does not perceive it to be.  When ticket scalpers targeted the 
Sandy Benefit Concert, the legislature was quick to respond with restrictions targeting the resale 
of charity concert tickets.
318
   Presumably, everyone agrees that scalping for a charity benefit 
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concert is and should be impermissible.  The everyday concert, however, produces strong views 
both in favor of secondary sale, and in favor of regulating or prohibiting secondary sale.   
There are different perspectives of fairness—fairness of the public’s access to what is 
perceived to be a fair price of a ticket in face value, and fairness in allowing the price of a ticket 
to be dictated by the free market.  If society deems it important enough, legislation should 
address the major issues and consumer concerns in the market: these include ticket ‘bots and 
ticket sniping, disclosure, price ceiling, ambiguity in applicable law, and paperless restrictions.   
Given the strong foundation present in the Bill Pascrall’s proposed BOSS Act, I would 
propose a BOSS Act “Plus.” While the BOSS Act is not a perfect piece of legislation, it is a 
promising and viable option which will do exactly what it aims to do—namely, provide better 
oversight of secondary sales and accountability in concert ticketing.  In its current proposed 
forms, the BOSS Act does not address ticket bots or paperless tickets.
319
  However, the next 
iteration of the Act will contain regulation targeting both ticket bots and paperless tickets.  That 
being the case, the only “Plus” I would recommend would be to include a clarification of the 
applicability of the CDA and CFAA to internet related scalping issues. 
National legislation is a viable option and should be encouraged.  Without uniformity, 
individual states will comprise an uneven playing field of ticket resale legality, and registration 
and disclosure requirements.  Given the prevalence of technology and the ease of operating from 
a distance, prohibitive legislation on a local scale is of limited value.  Online websites make 
statewide or local legislation difficult to enforce. 
320
   Federal legislation “may create more 
uniform enforcement and ease jurisdictional problems.”321  Further, individual states that decide 
to regulate ticket resale, in both transparency of ticket withholding and prohibition on resale, 
may suffer the loss of talent in its venues, as artists take their act across the border.
322
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If Congress is reluctant to address ticket scalping on a federal level, the states could seek 
to adopt a uniform legislation; a Uniform Ticket Resale Act.  Uniform legislation would serve to 
address the problems of scalpers moving across state lines or operating from a distance.  It would 
also remedy, to the extent adopted, issues of one state being ‘less attractive’ than another based 
on its local law and potentially stricter ticket resale law. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Many of the same problems that faced the consumer in the 1800s face the consumer today.  The 
‘virtual line’ is cut by a modern day scalper with computer software, are then listed with 
secondary sellers.  As in the 1800s, legislation is sparse and ill-equipped to address the issue.  
States seem to allow the practice. The current ticket market has responded with its own measures 
to address scalping problems, which come with their own issues.  Incorrect federal law has been 
applied.  A uniform ticket resale law is recommended to clarify this ambiguity and remedy ticket 
resale issues across the several states, and address the modern day problems of ticket bots and 
remedy of paperless tickets.  It may be some time before this occurs, if ever.   
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